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RECENT DECISIONS
Contractors: Promissory Estoppel-The plaintiff, a general contractor, was preparing a bid for a school construction project. According to the custom of the trade, he received bids by telephone from
numerous subcontractors for various parts of the construction project,
among which was a bid from the defendant for the paving work. Since
the defendant's bid of $7,131 was the lowest received for the paving
work, the plaintiff used it in computing his general bid, which he then
submitted along with the required ten per cent bidder's bond and the
name of the defendant as subcontractor for the paving. The plaintiff
was awarded the general contract, and the next day he went to the defendant's office to accept the paving bid. Before he did so, however, the
defendant told him that an error had been made in the bid. When the
defendant refused to do the job for less than $15,000, the plaintiff sued
and recovered the difference between the defendant's original bid and
the cost of engaging another firm to do the work. The Supreme Court
of California, in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 1 affirmed the judgment,
on the grounds that the plaintiff's detrimental reliance made the defendant's bid irrevocable. In holding that the defendant's attempted
revocation was ineffective, the court presented an unusual application
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as expressed in Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts.2 Noting that Section 90 has been applied in
numerous California cases involving commercial transactions, 3 the court
reasoned that this section is analogous to Section 45 of the Restatement
of Contracts, 4 and comment (b) thereunder. 5 It held that, since an offer
for a unilateral contract includes an implied subsidiary promise not to
revoke the offer if part of the requested performance is given. "Reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change of position affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to
151 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P. 2d 757 (1958).
2 "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §90 (1932).
3Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 255 P. 2d 772 (1953);
Frebank Co. v. White, 152 Cal. App. 2d 522, 313 P. 2d 633 (1957) ; Wade v.
Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P. 2d 497 (1953) ; West v. Hunt
Foods Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 225 P. 2d 978 (1950); Hunter v. Sparling,
87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P. 2d 807 (1948); see 18 Cal. Jur. 2d 407-408; 5
Stan. L. Rev. 783 (1953).
4 "If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration
requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto,
the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of
which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered within
the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §45 (1932).
5 "The main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, -that if
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revoke an offer for a bilateral contract." 6 Even though the defendant's
bid was an offer for a bilateral contract, and the plaintiff had not accepted it before the attempted withdrawal, the defendant nevertheless should
have foreseen the substantial possibility that his bid would be the lowest received, and that the plaintiff would therefore include it in his own
bid. When the plaintiff was awarded the general contract, he incurred
a prejudicial change of position in reliance upon the defendant's bid,
and therefore the court held that injustice could be avoided only by
enforcing the implied subsidiary promise not to revoke the bid.
The Drennan decision is directly contrary to the decision reached
7
in an earlier federal case, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., which
involved a similar fact situation. In that case the defendant, after having offered to sell linoleum to the plaintiff contractor at a stated price
"for prompt acceptance after the general contract has been awarded"
to the plaintiff, withdrew his bid after the plaintiff had submitted a
general bid which included the linoleum prices quoted by the defendant,'
The two cases are in substantial agreement in that they both reject
the theory that the plaintiff's use of the subcontractor's bid would itself
constitute an acceptance of the offer, thereby creating a bilateral contract, or that the defendant had offered the plaintiff an irrevocable
option in exchange for the use of his figures in computing the general
bid. It was evident in both cases that the subcontractor had not bargained merely for the use of his bid, but rather he had contemplated
the normal communication of an aceptance by the plaintiff. On the
question of the application of promissory estoppel, however, the two
decisions present contrasting viewpoints. In the James Baird Co. case,
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit, expressly rejects the possibility of applying the doctrine where the offeror has
proposed a bargain or exchange, i.e., expected a promise or a specified
act in return for his offer. Thus, he would apparently limit the doctrine to the enforcement of donative promises. 9 This view has been
part of the requested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke his
offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part performance or
tender may thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary promise. Moreover,
merely acting in justifiable reliance on any offer may in some cases serve as
sufficient reason for making a promise binding (see section 90). RESTATEMENT,

6 CONTRACTS,

§45, comment b (1932).

Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra, note 1, at 760.
764 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
s Although the situation differs from that of the Drennan case in that the subcontractor withdrew his bid before the general contract had been awarded
to the plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff in turn could presumably withdraw
his bid, the element of detrimental reliance would still exist, because if the
plaintiff withdrew his bid he would probably forfeit his deposit and in addition lose a profitable contract.
9 judge Hand stated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel "is to be chiefly
found in those cases where persons subscribe to a venture, usually charitable,
and are held to their promises after it has been completed." Although recog-
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criticised by some writers.10 However, Professor Corbin, in his treatise on contracts, has expressed approval of Judge Hand's decision
apparently on the theory that the defendant could not be expected to
foresee that the plaintiff would rely on his bid."
While the court in the Drennan case held that the defendant should
have foreseen the plaintiff's reliance, a more difficult problem is
whether or not such reliance was reasonable, since there are several
legal devices by which he could have bound the subcontractor to hold
his offer open until after the general contract had been awarded. For
example, he could have entered a bilateral contract with the defendant,
conditional upon the general contract being awarded to the plaintiff."-'
He might also have obtained an irrevocable option from the defendant,
the consideration for which might have been the use of the defendant's
bid, or he might have required the defendant to put up a performance
bond. It does not seem that such binding devices would be feasible,
however, in the usual contractor-subcontractor relationship, with its
informal bidding procedures, and with the large number of bids that
are received by the general contractor.' 3
Another guage by which the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance was determined was the attitude of the plaintiff after he had
been awarded the general contract. He could not delay his acceptance
of the subcontractor's offer, causing the burden of changes in the
nizing that it has been applied much more broadly as generalized in section
90 of the Restatement of Contracts, he held that "it does not apply to the
case at bar. Offers are ordinarily made in exchange for a consideration ...
In such cases they propose bargains; they presuppose that each promise or
performance is the inducement to the other.... There is no room in such a
situation for the doctrine of promissory estoppel." James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., supra, note 7, at 346.
10 20 Va. L. Rev. 214 (1933) ; 28 Ill. L. Rev. 419 (1933) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
§139 (Rev. ed. 1936) states: "There would seem, however, compelling reasons
of justice for enforcing promises, where injustice cannot otherwise be
avoided, where they have led the promisee to incur any substantial detriment
on the faith of them, not only when the promisor intended, but also when
he should reasonably have expected such detriment would be incurred, though
he did not request it as an exchange for his promise."
a1"One who submits a bid for supplying materials requests and has reason to
foresee an acceptance . . . but usually he should not be held to foresee that
the offeree would make a contract with a third person at a price that is
determined by the terms of the bid, before the bid itself has been accepted
and without notifying the bidder that his bid is going to be so used. Even if
he knows that his bid will be used on some larger contract, it should still be
revocable by notice given while the offeree's bid on the larger contract is still
revocable at will." 1 COPN, CONTRACTS, §51 (1959).
12 This type of agreement was suggested by Judge Hand in James Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros., supra, note 7, at 345; see also Frederick Raff Co. v. Murphy,
110 Conn. 234, 147 Atl. 709 (1929).
13 e.g., in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra, note 1, the plaintiff received between 50 and 75 bids by telephone, all on the final day of bidding. For an
informative survey of bidding procedures followed by contractors and subcontractors in the state of Indiana, see Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A
Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
237 (1952).
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market price to fall upon the subcontractor, or attempt to "shop
around" for a lower bid than the one he had used, or attempt to reopen
bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the original offer. 14 The fact that the plaintiff
was required to include in his own bid the names of subcontractors
who were to perform one-half of one per cent or more of the construction work, one of which was the defendant, would seem to be some
indication, at least, that the plaintiff would be bound to accept the
defendant's bid.
Finally, the element of mistake was considered by the court in
determining whether the plaintiff's reliance was reasonable. There is
practically universal agreement that where an offeree knows or has
reason to know that a material mistake has been made by the offeror.
the offeree cannot take advantage of such mistake, and attempt to
bind the offer to a contract. 13 In the Drennan case the plaintiff had
no reason to suspect that the defendant had made a mistake, since there
was usually a variance of as much as 160 per cent between the highest
and lowest bids for paving work in that particular locality. 16 Therefore the defendant's unilateral mistake was not a ground for revocation of the bid.
It appears that the only other reported decision in which a general
contractor was able to recover on the theory of promissory estoppel
from a subcontractor who had refused to perform after the general
contractor had relied on his bid, was Northwestern Engineering Co. v.
Ellerman,17 cited by the court in the Drennan case. In the Northwestern case, however, the plaintiff entered into a detailed written
agreement with the defendant, whereby the defndant promised to do
the sewer construction work at a specified price in the event that the
plaintiff was awarded a general contract for the construction of an airbase. Although the South Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the
trial court that the written agreement itself failed for lack of consideration, since the plaintiff was not bound to submit a bid on the airbase
project, nevertheless the plaintiff did in fact submit a bid, relying on
14 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra, note 1, at 760; R. J. Daum Construction
Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P. 2d 817 (1952).
CONTRACTS, §94 (Rev. Ed. 1936); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §610
(1950) ; Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand, Inc., 117 F. 2d 654 (7th Cir.
1941). In the last cited case the plaintiff was unable to recover damages
from a manufacturer who had quoted a price of $26,450 for one air conditioning unit. The plaintiff, claiming that the quoted price was for two units,
included the figure in his own bid for the installation of air conditioning
equipment in the University of Chicago. The court, although it made the
general statement that the fact that a transaction is commercial in nature
should not preclude the application of promissory estoppel, held that the
laintiff should have realized that the quoted price was for one unit.
16Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra, note 1.
17 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W. 2d 879 (1943), reversed on other grounds, 71 S.D. 236,
23 N.W. 2d 273 (1946).
15WILLISTON,
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defendant's figures, and was awarded the contract before the defendant's attempted withdrawal. Under these circumstances, the court said:
Obviously it would seem unjust and unfair, after appellant was
declared the successful bidder, and imposed with all the obligations of such, to allow respondents to retract their promise and
permit the effect of such retraction to fall upon the appellant."8
It should be noted that the South Dakota court did not imply a
subsidiary promise to hold the bid open, as did the California court,
requiring the plaintiff to accept the offer within a reasonable time after
the general contract had been awarded. Instead, Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts was applied directly to the subcontractor's
bid, making it a "binding promise," presumably without requiring the
plaintiff to tender an acceptance in order to create an enforceable contract. It would seem that in this respect the Drennan decision is more
equitable to the subcontractor, since the plaintiff cannot "shop around"
for a lower bid after the general award, and take the defendant's offer
only if he finds that he can do no better elsewhere. Here the defendant's promise is "binding" only in the sense that it cannot be withdrawn
until the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to accept the bid.
Promissory estoppel is thus applied to the implied promise to hold the
bid open, and not to the bid itself.
In view of the apparently weaker bargaining position of the subcontractor, the effect of the Drennan decision would seem to put him
at an even greater disadvantage, were it not for the fact that he can
avoid being bound by merely reserving the right to revoke his bid at
any time before the general contractor has accepted it. The court was
able to imply the subsidiary promise to hold the bid offer open only
because the defendant had failed to reserve that right. As long as he
can withdraw with impunity, either when the general contractor does
not promptly tender an acceptance after the general award, or in any
event if he indicates unequivocally that his bid will be subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance, the subcontractor need not fear
that the effect of the Drennan decision is to tie his hands as soon as
the general contractor relies on his bid. With these safeguards for the
subcontractor, the decision is an equitable one, and helps to clarify the
legal implications involved in general contractor-subcontractor bidding
procedures.
JAMES ARTHUR KERN
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Id. at 883.

